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Abstract
Abolishing  a  nearly  50-year-old  policy  for  rice  price  support,  Korea 
a d o p t e d  a  n e w  d i r e c t  p a y m e n t  p r o g r a m  i n  2 0 0 5 .  M a k i n g  t h e  t r a n -
sition to decoupled income support has been governed by the need 
for  operative  and  effective  income  safety  nets  and  the  WTO  dis-
ciplines on domestic support. The program aims to deal with over-sup-
p l y  o f  r i c e  w h i l e  g u a r d i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  i n c o m e  i n s e c u r ity. 
Integrated  into  a  target  price  mechanism,  the  fixed  and  variable 
payments  compensate  part  of  farm  income  loss  arising  from  adverse 
market  conditions.  An  empirical  estimation  based  on  the  farm-level 
data is performed to test the degree of a linkage between rice sup-
port and production. The analysis suggests that rice support have only 
marginal influence on production with the elasticity of 0.03. To secure 
a smooth implementation of structural reforms and meet the WTO dis-
ciplines, Korea may continue to transfer its support into a decoupled, 
Green  Box  type  measure.
*    An  original  version  of  this  paper  was  prepared  for  presentation  at  the  American 
Agricultural  Economics  Association  Annual  Meeting,  Portland,  Oregon,  July 
29-August  1,  2007.
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Ⅰ. Introduction
Since the 1980s, almost all developed and developing countries have carried out 
agricultural policy reforms (FAO 2005). Increasing pressure on government pol-
icies arises from the common observation that agricultural support causes sur-
plus production that needs high budgetary costs and sometimes trade distortions. 
In this sense, the main debate on agricultural policy reform at the national and 
international levels centers on whether agricultural support is forged to have a 
minimal bearing on trade or production.
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) in 1994 recog-
nized the reform process as substantial reductions in support and protection 
(Article 20), and set up specific rules on policy instruments. The URAA’s dis-
ciplines on domestic support depend on to what extent it spawns market and 
trade distortions. The Amber Box refers to most trade distorting subsidies that 
countries have to reduce. Output payments linked to production-limiting pro-
grams are classified as the Blue Box. The Blue Box payments are without limit. 
Finally, the Green Box includes fixed direct payments having no, or at most 
minimal, effects on trade and production. The Green Box payments can be in-
creased without limit.
The reform process embodying a shift from more distorting to less dis-
torting support, or transition from the Amber Box to the Green Box, equals to 
decoupling. Decoupling is to break the link between policy measures and trade 
or production. OECD (2005a) defines a decoupled measure as such would neither 
have any current condition associated with production or production factors nor 
create any expectation that a farmer’s production decision today could have influ-
ence on tomorrow’s payments. OECD (2005b) clarifies its definition of a de-
coupled measure as ex post empirical in contrast to the URAA’s legal definition.
The URAA has contributed to policy reforms in many countries. For 
example, flooding out large farm outlays and resulting imbalance in certain 
commodity markets, the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
reforms were agreed to rein in over-production and prepare trade liberalization. 
The 1992 CAP reform introduced compensatory direct payments against de-
creases in intervention prices, a first stepping-stone on the path to decoupled 
support from particular crops. The following reforms through Agenda 2000 and 
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highlight of the 2003 reform was to invent the Single Farm Payments (SFPs) 
delinking support from crops and prices while linking it to wanted standards 
for environment, food safety and animal welfare.
As for the United States, the 1996 Farm Bill (FB) made a bold change 
into a market-oriented support mechanism where farmers could freely decide on 
what to produce based on market signals. Since the government assigned pre-
determined direct payments over the implementation period, Agricultural 
Marketing Transition Act (AMTA) payments were considered as fully 
decoupled. However, the 2002 FB is reversed from decoupling by adding 
Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCPs) that were tied to price. The decoupled 
AMTA payments were embedded in ‘Direct Payments’ under the 2002 FB.
Following the suit set up by the European Union and the United States 
in one sense and taking into account of the development in the WTO rules, 
Korea has increasingly adopted direct payment mechanisms and the process of 
decoupling. This article is to review such a policy reform in the country high-
lighting policy transition to decoupled income support. Detailed discussion ad-
dresses the direct payment scheme for rice and its implementation issues. This 
paper also summarizes the likely impacts of the rice scheme by examining pre-
vious empirical studies.
Ⅱ. Evolution of Rice Support Policies
Agricultural policy reform in Korea has been largely driven by external forces 
including the disciplines on domestic support by the URAA and rapid growth 
in farm imports spurred by dismantling trade barriers. Korea is one of few 
countries in the WTO membership which is actually and substantially bound by 
reduction obligations in the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) and thus has 
had to adjust its rice support system.
As seen in Figure 1, the URAA obligates the country to reduce Amber 
Box support from 2,183 to 1,490 billion won over the 1995~2004 period. 
What’s required was a gradual cut in support. During the same period, the cur-
rent total AMS averaged out at 92 percent of the Final Bound Total AMS.
Figure 2 shows that the AMS use ratio, estimated by Current Total 
AMS over Final Bound Total AMS ranks, is larger than those of major Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 172
countries. For instance, the European Union records 60 percent in average and 
the United Sates and Japan are averaged out at 54 percent and 32 percent, 
respectively.
FIGURE  1.    Final  Bound  Total  and  Current  AMS  for  Korea
Source: WTO (2007)
FIGURE  2.    Changes  in  the  AMS  Use  Ratio
Note: Current total AMS figures are estimates for the United States in 2005, and for 
Japan in 2004~05.
Source: Drawn from WTO (2006; 2007)Transition to Decoupled Rice Support and Its Production Effects in Korea 173
The fairly high AMS use ratio suggests that little or no ‘water’ in the 
AMS made Korea face a real cut in trade distorting support from the beginning 
of the URAA implementation. An early response from the government was to 
slim down rice support to comply with the reduction commitment. Because the 
product specific AMS for rice explained 97 percent of the Current Total AMS, 
it was unavoidable to reduce the support level.
Since introducing the government purchase program in 1961, rice poli-
cy has changed a long way. But, the essence of policy variants remains the 
same as stabilizing farm incomes, ensuring food security and managing the sup-
ply and demand of the staple crop. Ahead of the URAA, the long lasting rice 
policy was reformed in a way to abridge government direct intervention in 
1993. This reform made up a curb on an increase in purchasing prices and wid-
ening price gaps across seasons. 
The government had to meet the declining AMS limit in line with the 
country schedule under the URAA. As prices were gradually increasing, the 
amount of purchased rice had to be further reduced. Figure 3 highlights a con-
tinual escalation in prices coupled with a sliding down in purchase volumes. 
Over the 1995~2003 period, the government proposed three times (years) to 
raise, three times to freeze, and two times to cut the purchase prices. The 
National Assembly, which had a right to approve government proposals, re-
sponded with four times of price freeze and six times of price raise. Because 
of political pressures and interests, the price rose by 26 percent; but, it was off-
set by a 48 percent drop in volume in the URAA period. The fact contrasts 
sharply with the cases of Japan and the Republic of China which have con-
tinued to bring down or lock in the prices since 1990 (MAF 2007).
Sumner and Lee (2000) pointed out that dominance of rice in Korean 
agriculture and its import quota, not the internal support policy, is credited to 
the large AMS. Rice AMS can be decomposed by an internal gap and an ex-
ternal gap. The internal gap represents a difference between purchase and farm 
gate prices and the external gap refers to a difference between farm gate and 
fixed external prices. Figure 4 shows the external gap overwhelms the internal 
gap. Nonetheless, an early reform in rice support policy would have contributed 
to an easy and effective reduction in the AMS.1 
  1 From a political perspective, a substantial cut in rice support price in a short term 
would  have  not  been  feasible  because  of  the  likely  strong  resistance  from  farm Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 174
FIGURE  3.    Changes  in  Rice  Prices  and  Procured  Volume
Source: MAF (2007)
FIGURE  4.    Decomposition  for  Rice  AMS
Note: These figures do not exactly match the notified AMS because of uniform prices 
used for different types of rice quality.
Source: Calculated from MAF (2007)
communities. Interestingly enough, farmers wanted to have direct payments in the 
1990s while they disliked doing away with the rice purchase program. Research on 
direct  payments  under  the  WTO  system  began  by  Lee  et  al.  (1995)  followed  by 
a  comprehensive  study  in  Suh  et  al.  (1996).Transition to Decoupled Rice Support and Its Production Effects in Korea 175
Kim (2003) claimed that government purchasing would not be sustain-
able because it had poor transfer effects on farm income and a diminishing role 
as a market price setter. He specifically asserted the direct income support ef-
fect of rice purchasing was only less than 9 percent of the government spending 
or accounted for smaller than 7 percent of the AMS during 1995~2002. In addi-
tion, the effectiveness of price and income support were further challenged by 
a decline in the proportion of purchase quantities in total production from 29 
percent in 1995 to 14 percent in 2004.
The first direct payment program for rice farming was the Direct 
Payment for Rice Paddy Farming (DPRPF) in 2001.2 In addition to farm in-
come support, the DPRPF aimed to secure a multifunctional role of paddy 
fields and promote environment protection and safe food production. The refer-
ence area was the farmland used for paddy farming during 1998~2000. Eligible 
farmers must maintain the shape and role of paddy fields in good agricultural 
and environmental condition. The payment was subject to cross-compliance in-
cluding a minimum standard for fertilizer use and pesticide residue. The pay-
ment rate was fixed at 0.53 million won per hectare in the Agricultural 
Promotion Area (APA) and 0.43 million won otherwise.3 A maximum size of 
the payment area per farm was set at 4 hectares. Most paddy fields were regis-
tered for the program and the aids amounted to 481 billion won in 2004.
To address the potential loss of income for rice farmers, the govern-
ment launched the Income Deficiency Payment for Rice Farming (IDPRF) in 
2002 (MAF 2003). Rice farmers kept a wary eye on over-supply, which was 
  2 The  first  direct  payment  program  in  the  country  is  the  Direct  Payment  for  Early 
Retirement  introduced  in  1997.  To  facilitate  large-scaled  farming  and  provide  in-
come safety to retiring farmers, the program aims at 63 to 69-year-old farmers who 
sell  or  rent  out  their  paddy  fields  for  at  least  5  years.  The  annual  payment  rate 
is about  3 million  won per hectare up to 8  years in the  case  of  selling farmland. 
Farmers renting out farmland receive one-time payment of about 3 million won per 
hectare.  A  maximum  size  of  the  payment  area  is  2  hectares.
In  1999,  the  Direct  Payment  for  Environment-Friendly  Farming  started out as the 
second direct program. The aid rate in 2006 for organic paddy farming is 0.39 mil-
lion  won  per  hectare.  About  20,780  hectares  of  farmland  are  registered  in  2005. 
A  pilot  program  for  environment-friendly  livestock  farming  is  also  introduced  in 
2004, aiming for reduction in livestock wastes and stock density rates. Up to 1,000 
livestock  farms  are  eligible  for  the  program.
  3 The  APA  is  zone-based  farmland  which  has  been  improved  by  consolidation  and 
rearrangement.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 176
attributable to an increase in imports under the Minimum Market Access 
(MMA),4 a dwindling volume of government purchase and a downward trend 
of rice consumption.5 To guard against the threat of income insecurity, the 
IDPRF compensated a part of income loss caused by a price decline. When a 
post-harvest farmgate price dropped below the reference price, an Olympic 
average of post-harvest farmgate prices for the previous 5 years, the program 
provides 80 percent of the gap to farmers. Farmers receiving the aid must de-
posit 0.5 percent of the reference price. About 16 percent of rice farms joined 
the program during 2002~2004, but stable post-harvest prices in the period pre-
vented it from triggering the payment.
As specified in the URAA, Korea renegotiated special treatment of rice 
in 2004 and agreed to increase MMA import from 4 percent in 2005 to nearly 
8 percent of domestic consumption (408,700 tons) in 2014. China, the United 
Sates, Thailand and Australia obtained country-specific quota for the MMA. 
The growing concern for rise in import and the need for income safety nets 
amid AMS constraint and declining consumption contributed to an overhaul of 
rice policy in 2005. 
Ⅲ. Making the Transition to Decoupled Income Payment
The key principles of rice policy reform in 2005 were targeting and decoupling. 
First, the reform immediately scrapped the 50-year-old government purchase 
program. Making transition from price support to decoupled income payment 
was unavoidable because of a looming WTO discipline for the AMS and deteri-
orating domestic market situations. Such a policy shift is expected to make 
room for policy flexibility given the fact that the rice purchase program made 
up almost all the AMS.
Second, the reform launched the Rice Income Deficiency Payment 
(RIDP) to provide farmers with ‘operative’ and ‘effective’ income safety nets. 
  4 In  line  with  Annex  V  of  the  URAA,  Korea  received  special  treatment  of  rice, 
non-tariffication along with MMA import up to 4 percent of domestic consumption 
for  10  years.
  5 Rice consumption per capita was reduced from 107 kilograms in 1995 to 79 kilo-
grams  in  2006  (MAF  2007).Transition to Decoupled Rice Support and Its Production Effects in Korea 177
The RIDP consists of fixed payment and variable payment. The fixed payment 
succeeded the DPRPF as a decoupled measure from production, whereas the 
variable payment inherited some characteristics of the IDPRF. Thus, the new 
RIDP is forged as an integrated version of previous support measures. The only 
difference is that the new program embodies a target price system. 
Third, the reform introduced the public stockholding program for rice to 
ensure food security. It is due to the abolition of the rice purchase program. 
Under the new scheme, the government obtains and releases rice at current mar-
ket prices. A target stock is predetermined at 0.87 million tons. The amount is 
approximately equivalent to a national food need for two months or 17~18 per-
cent of domestic consumption as recommended by the FAO. The Annex V of 
the URAA recognizes the public stockholding program as a Green Box measure.
Figure 5 explains how the RIDP is structured and operated. For the 
2005~2007 years, a target price is 170,083 won per 80 kilograms, accounting 
for the average harvest price (158,000 won) during 2001~2003, estimated in-
come effects from the DPRPF (9,000 won), and government purchasing of rice 
(3,000 won). 
The target price is subject to change every three years to accommodate 
the rate of change in average post-harvest prices between the initial period and 
last three-year period.6 It is intended to embody recent changes in the market. 
But, the National Assembly has a right to approve the proposed target price.







Fixed: 1.0 mill ha Variable: 0.94 mill ha
Variable payment
  6 The  post-harvest  season  spans  from  October  1
st t o  J a n u a r y  3 1
st.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 178
The reference area is the paddy fields cultivated with rice, lotus roots, 
dropwort, or sedges in the 1998~2000 period. Given stricter property right re-
strictions on the APA, the payment rate for the APA is about 20 percent larger 
than others. In 2005, the APA represented 69 percent of the registered paddy 
fields under the fixed payment (MAF 2007).
For the year 2005, the fixed payment rate was 600,000 won per hectare 
in average or 9,836 won per 80 kilograms of rice. The area size reached about 
1 million hectares or about 93 percent of the total paddy fields. Cross com-
pliance applies as follows: First, farmers must maintain and manage the field 
soil to the extent that crop production is possible. Second, farmers must set up 
and maintain field boundaries in good condition. Third, farmers must maintain 
and manage water canals and drains attached to the fields. Finally, farmers must 
take weed control so as not to disturb neighboring fields.
There are extra eligibility criteria for the variable payment. First, farm-
ers must grow rice in standing water of the fields. Second, farmers must meet 
the standard for pesticide residues. Third, farmers must comply with the recom-
mended use of chemical fertilizers. About 0.94 million hectares joined the vari-
able payment program in 2005. The variable payment equals to the 85 percent 
of the gap between target and farmgate prices after the fixed payment. 
Variable payment = (TP－post-harvest average price)*85/100－fixed payment
Figure 6 explains how the RIDP functioned to ensure farm income in 
2005. An average farmer received 140,028 won per 80 kilograms of rice from 
the market and 25,546 won as the fixed and variable payment totaling 165,574 
won. Thanks to the program, farmers bore only a 3 percent decline in final pri-
ces against a 13 percent drop in post-harvest prices during 2004~2005. The 
RIDP turned out to be effective to attenuate farm income loss against adverse 
market conditions.
The RIDP is nothing new as other countries maintain comparable 
mechanisms to protect farm income loss. Figure 7 highlights income support 
systems for the European Union, Japan, Korea and the United States, simplified 
for comparison. First, Korea and the United State have much in common with 
a target price system. But, rice is the only program crop in Korea. Japan puts 
forward reference production costs as support goals for barley, soybean, sugarTransition to Decoupled Rice Support and Its Production Effects in Korea 179
FIGURE  6.    Composition  of  Farm  Income  during  2004~2005
Note: The fixed payment in 2004 refers to the Direct Payment for Rice Paddy 
Farming.
beet and potatoes.7 The target prices and reference production costs are all fixed 
in advance. The United States raised the target prices for the 2004~2007 period 
for most program commodities. It is not clear if Korea will forge into a cut 
in the target price in 2007. It is too early to say about Japan’s program since 
it has just launched in 2007. The European Union has designated the target pri-
ces for grains as suitable price levels but they are not part of the CAP mecha-
nism (USDA 1999).
Second, an integral part of the income support system is the direct pay-
ment in all four countries. While Korea and the United States address farm in-
come through commodity-specific payments, the European Union’s Single 
Payment Scheme (SPS) deals with whole farm income. Japan’s CSCMSP based 
upon a gap between production conditions is more or less similar to the whole 
farm approach.
The variable payment is also a common feature. The CCPs in the 
United States incorporate the difference between the target price and the effec-
tive price which is the sum of direct payments and the higher of the average 
market price or the loan rate. Similarly, Korea’s variable payment deals with 
the gap between the target price and the sum of the market price and fixed 
payment. The European Union maintains some product-specific direct aids cou-
pled with production.
  7 This new support system is called as the Cross-Sectional Commodity Management 
Stabilization  Program  (CSCMSP).Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 180
FIGURE  7.    Comparison  of  Farm  Income  Support  Mechanisms
















Note: Support mechanisms are simplified for comparison. Also, note that program 
commodities are not identical.
Finally, the European Union and the United States maintain price sup-
port measures with intervention price and loan rate, respectively. As a safety 
net, they provide floor prices for certain commodities. Since the 1992 CAP re-
form, intervention prices have been cut and have been partly replaced with the 
direct payment. The 2002 Farm Bill in the United States authorizes the reduc-
tion of loan rates for many program commodities over the 2004~2007 period.
Ⅳ. Production Effects of Rice Support
1. Data Characteristics
As is often the case in other countries, the lack of accurate data has deterred 
estimations of the impacts from decoupled income support. The best alternative 
data would be the Farm Household Economy Survey Report (FHESR) by the 
Korea National Statistics Office which provides yearly statistical information on 
3,200 sample farm households. It has a single data entry for public subsidy en-
compassing all the government support. More specifically, the subsidy data in-
clude not only direct payments but other subsidies such as support for needy Transition to Decoupled Rice Support and Its Production Effects in Korea 181
households, educational aids and transportation subsidies for the elderly.
The aggregated nature of the data does not reveal the accurate amount 
of rice support, but the data could be quite useful to attest to potential ripple 
effects of rice support on production. Thus, a balanced panel data set over the 
1998-2002 period is constructed with 2,348 households, of which 1,280 house-
holds have rice revenues accounting for more than 60 percent of total revenues.
Table 1 shows statistical summary of the data set. The average size of 
paddy field per farm is 9,048 m
2 and the paddy field represents about 60 per-
cent of arable land. The government support amounts to 671,773 won and it 
turns out to vary quite large across sample farms. 









Average 9,048 15,170 671,773 58
Standard deviation 11,187 13,481 2,812,464 11
Source: The Korea National Statistics Office
2. Model Specifications
Equation (1) is proposed to examine a relationship between production and pub-
lic subsidies, mostly rice support.
(1) AP = f(AP-i, PMT, AGE)
where AP is the size of rice fields, AP-i is a lagged term of AP, PMT repre-
sents public subsidies and AGE is farmer’s age.
The dependent variable becomes the size of rice fields because the data 
set does not have individual farm’s production information. If government sub-
sidies stimulate larger production, the coefficient of PMT will be significant and 
positive. The sign of AGE coefficient may not be determinant. The aging farm-
ers would not keep expanding their farm sizes and so would do young farmers 
who are in the 20s and 30s.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 182
3. Estimated Results and Implications
Equation (2) shows the estimated results in a double log specification. 
(2) log AP =-0.06+1.12*log(AP-1)  0.15*log(AP-2)+0.03*log(PMT)
(-0.66) (13.59)**            (-1.87)*        (2.93)***
Adjusted R
2= 0.92, Log likelihood = -4.72, F-stat = 2,849.75
The levels of statistical significance are indicated by *** (1 percent), 
** (5 percent) and * (10 percent). Standard errors are corrected in the presence 
of heteroskedasticity. The coefficient of public subsidies is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level and the one and two-period lagged terms of rice 
fields are also significant at 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. The elas-
ticity of public subsidies appears to be only marginal at 0.03. 
Such a low elasticity of public subsidies can be explained by two 
factors. First, the comprehensive nature of data contributes to a weak linkage 
between rice production and government support. Inclusion of all subsidies in 
data might have diluted the degree of its overall effect on production. Second, 
the low elasticity could reflect the nature of paddy fields which tend to show 
fixity in use over time with physical and cultural characteristics and 
significance. Despite data limitations, the empirical estimate casts light on the 
fact that rice support is largely decoupled from production.
This finding is compatible with previous studies. Using the OECD’s 
Policy Evaluation Matrix model, Seong et al. (2003) finds that an increase in 
direct payment for rice by 5 percent does not influence the supply and demand 
for rice.  Kim and Kim (2003) reports that direct payments for rice have a mar-
ginal production effect, increasing average area per farm from 0.96 ha to 1.00 
ha.8 
  8 There are other studies which find some production effects of rice support. For ex-
ample, Sakong (2007) concludes that the fixed payment of the RIDP has no effect 
on  production.  But,  its  variable  payments  tend  to  show  some  production  effects. 
Adopting  a  similar  utility  function  with  uncertainty,  Lee  (2006)  suggests  that  the 
present  form  of  the  RIDP  has  a  production  effect.Transition to Decoupled Rice Support and Its Production Effects in Korea 183
Ⅴ. Conclusion
Transition to decoupled income support is regarded as a significant policy re-
form in line with greening support and the WTO rules. The empirical estima-
tion indicates that rice support by and large has little production effect. But it 
needs more robust analyses with appropriate farm level data on direct payments 
and management decision. If it passes such a decoupling test, direct payments 
for rice can be safely claimed as a Green Box measure under the WTO 
classification.
Ensuring continuity of the RIDP depends on changes in market con-
ditions and upcoming WTO rules on domestic support. As by law enacted, a 
new target price for the 2008~2010 will be based on 2004~2006 average prices. 
As of the beginning of 2008, it is uncertain if the National Assembly will ap-
prove a 5.2 percent drop of the target price, 161,265 won per 80 kilograms of 
rice. Farmers and farm community are asking to keep the target price as it is.
To meet the AMS reduction discipline setting by the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), Korea may have to rein in rice support (WTO 
2008). For example, a 40 percent cut in the AMS and keeping the same fixed 
payments over the implementation period would require a reduction in the tar-
get price to 140,000 won by 2017 (Lim et al. 2007).9 In other words, the varia-
ble payments would be subject to AMS ceilings.
If the country wants to avoid a weakening income safety net, it may opt 
to underpin decoupled or fixed payments. The transition from variable direct pay-
ments to decoupled support can be a tangible alternative from a policy per-
spective, and it should contribute to structural adjustment and a reform process 
by motivating competition and farmland mobilization. Two points are worth  con-
sidering in this regard. First, the share of direct payments in agricultural budget 
accounts is still far lower than those in Japan, the European Union and the 
United States (Kim et al. 2006). Second, new regulations from the DDA are like-
ly to exempt decoupled support from a reduction commitment so that a member 
country may be able to uphold a Green Box type of policy measures for a while.
  9 The  DDA  modalities  have  suggested  that  developed  countries  other  than  the 
European Union, the United States and Japan cut their AMS by 45 percent and de-
veloping  countries  apply  two-thirds  of  the  reduction  rate.  A  40  percent  cut  is  se-
lected  to  reflect  these  reduction  rates.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 184
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